SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
A number of old Czech traditional songs speak about battles with Turks. In fact legends of our ancestors describe historical events which haven't happened in the Middle East but in the Balkans. The Balkans region has been perceived as the least stable part of Europe for many centuries. Unfortunately, the end of the 20 th century wasn't an exception. Decades of unsolved problems between different cultures, prejudice, and lack of tolerance caused conflict in the former Yugoslavia.
When all that ethnic violence was finally stopped by the IFOR deployment to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the civilized world called for an investigation of atrocities and reestablishment of the living conditions for refugees and displaced persons, another hell broke out just a few kilometers further, Kosovo 2 .
Despite enormous diplomatic effort on the part of the UN Security Council, the NATO Due to the durable compliance, the Serb Armed Forces later transformed from VJ to VSiCG (Vojska Srbie i Crnej Gory) so that KFOR representatives could change their suspicious attitude. Serbs were no longer a threat to NATO and KFOR, but partners. Again, this attitude differed from nation to nation, but generally Serbs proved to be cooperative 9 .
KFOR Changes through Periods of Development and Transition
Development and changes of KFOR occurred as a natural process and transformation basically followed a plan. As the situation in Kosovo became to be more stable, units started to shrink and also routine tasks were changed. Peacekeeping forces became to be less robust, fixed tasks were slowly terminated, units were encouraged to use soft skin rather than armored vehicles and to perform a low profile.
The initial role for the KFOR contingent was to deter and expel Yugoslav security forces and to demilitarize the KLA. Clearly defined military tasks were fulfilled with excellent results.
KFOR disarmed the KLA and has remained as a deterrent for any external threats, including the potential intervention of Serbian security forces.
In next the stage, KFOR focused its attention on security of the internal environment.
Routine security procedures like monitoring, patrolling and searching were conducted by KFOR units, mostly from fixed positions. At the same time foundations for the future parts of the security system were established. United Nation Mission In Kosovo -Police (UNMIK -P) supervising the Kosovo Police Service (KPS) started working with the full support of KFOR.
The KFOR role as a leading security force in Kosovo was slowly changing as certain responsibilities were handed over to UNMIK-P and KPS. KFOR was supposed to only assist the police to lead operations.
New Concept for KFOR
In accordance with a plan of development and transformation of KFOR, a new concept of the Maneuvering Task Force was introduced beginning in 2004. The principle of the concept consisted in the total disassembling and restructuring of KFOR units 10 . The concept was rehearsed in the Multinational Brigade Center (MNB C) since the beginning of 2004 and the following rotations reflected this new structure and manning. There were many requirements to meet but the main presumption was that initiative and responsibility for the security situation will lie with UNMIK-P/KPS. KFOR will just provide assistance if necessary. Considering the issue from that perspective, the concept was premature because conditions were not favorable yet 11 .
UNMIK-P and especially the KPS were not prepared to take a leading role for the security issues.
Foreshadowing the Violence
Ethnic to Ethnic Animosity Continues
The In Pristina, a gradual deterioration in the security environment found expression in explosive devices threatening UNMIK and Kosovo officials 17 .
The annual cycle of KLA commemorative events on 3-7 March brought out large crowds in Pristina and Prekaz and refocused public attention on grievances that the "liberation struggle"
was being insufficiently recognized. Frustration and disappointment had been increasing throughout all of Kosovo, and declining respect for KFOR and UNMIK was obvious.
Events in March 2004
Setting the Stage
The violence was triggered on the evening of 15 March when nineteen year old Kosovar Serb Jovica Ivic was shot and severely wounded in the Serb village of Caglavica, which is located just outside Pristina on the highway going south to Macedonia. Allegedly, it was a driveby shooting. Local Serbs reacted immediately as they had many times before, by blocking the highway. For them it was another in a series of intimidating "terrorist" incidents, and they felt that KFOR and UNMIK were not paying sufficient attention. The Swedish Battalion (SWEBAT)
Commander decided to organize a detour through the village of Gracanica in order to maintain the route from Pristina to Skopje. However Serbs remained, blocking roads in the Caglavica - During and immediately following the events of 17-18 March, international officials began to assert that the violence was more planned than spontaneous. Understanding where the riots came from, how they spread, and how and why they ended when they did is important both to prevent recurrence and for shaping future policy. The reality appears to have been a series of local outbursts and actions without central planning but with a high degree of local coordination.
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There are also indications that in at least one area, outsiders may have been involved.
Yet, there was another, more calculated side to the violence. There are reports of hardcore groups traveling long distances to join, some in buses. Groups from rural parts of Kosovo or Albania appeared to be involved in Mitrovica and Pristina.
Media in Serbia released statements that the action was organized and coordinated from one center.
The nearly synchronized appearance of many of the attacks launched from mid-afternoon to evening of the first day in locations such as Kosovo Polje, Lipjan and Obilic -just as KFOR and the police committed forces to Caglavica -speaks to a degree of command and control.
There had clearly been premeditation and reserve-planning by extremist and criminal groups.
UNMIK police counted 33 major riots over 17-18 March, involving an estimated 51,000
participants, some of whom used military weapons. The attacks on Kosovar Serbs, their property, churches and monasteries, exploded all over Kosovo in both urban centers and villages. It remains unclear whether or not the attacks were planned in advance. Why did the riots fizzle out on the third day, 19 March? By the evening of 18 March, the tide began to turn. Prime Minister Rexhepi plunged into the crowd at Veterinik to urge an end, and PDK leader Thaci made a strong television appeal. The hysterical energy of the first day was ebbing and, within the formal organizations involved in the demonstrations, the consensus was turning to a halt 24 . The announcement of KFOR reinforcements, and the quick arrival, in particular, of a British infantry battalion that was already patrolling Pristina streets on the morning of 19 March strengthened the atmosphere of restraint.
KFOR Failures During the Crisis
Two days of the worst violence in Kosovo revealed that KFOR wasn't prepared to deal with such events and actually failed to carry out its mission. The public order challenge lasting over the two days (33 major riots were counted, 51,000 rioters, some using military weapons were involved) would have stretched even the most coherent security structure to the limit. The violence revealed that KFOR and UNMIK did not have such a structure.
The two days of violence were a sad demonstration of limited determination by the security forces. Accordingly, post conflict evaluation reports that KFOR really resisted only at Caglavica, but even there, by committing most of Multinational Brigade Center's troops to a last ditch defense, it left the rest of Pristina region virtually unprotected.
It was obvious that KFOR HQ and even the Multinational Brigades were caught without a contingency plan. 25 KFOR did a creditable humanitarian job, but a terrible military one. Except at Caglavica, it was defeated.
The peacekeeping mission's security system lacked the capacity to anticipate. If KFOR and the police had been more alert dealing with initial events at the two starting points -the main bridge dividing Mitrovica and the Caglavica highway blockade -the fighting could have been suppressed 26 . The intelligence flow of information wasn't fast enough to be able to be used to reach a proper KFOR HQ decision-making level.
The chain of command was exposed as disjointed. Over two years a process of "normalization" saw the gradual decrease of international troops, from an original 45,000 to 17,500 with a further drawdown planned, and KFOR's move away from manpower-costly fixed positions towards "area security." At the same time, many duties previously fulfilled by the UNMIK-P were being turned over to the KPS. On 17 March responsibilities were divided --and obscured --between KFOR, UNMIK-P and KPS. As afternoon wore into evening, coordination and force coherence began to fall apart. But the most visible failure was KFOR's 27 .
However KFOR wasn't the only player on the security forces' side. Other parts of the security forces were UNMIK Police and KPS. The KPS had been trained and prepared as the only Kosovo armed force to deal with such public disorder. Unfortunately, KPS officers were left rudderless, without coherent orders. Their behavior was based on their individual attitudes driven by their own ethnic feeling and prejudice 28 .
The different nationalities of UNMIK-P officers and their short acquaintance with each other had prevented any real esprit de corps from developing, and the deficit was apparent as lieutenants and sergeants had difficulty galvanizing unfamiliar subordinates into decisive but dangerous action. Several UNMIK-P commanders appeared to restrict their actions to protecting their own police stations 29 .
It was in the divided town of Mitrovica that coordination between KFOR troops and police reached both its highest and lowest point, depending on which side of the river they were on 30 .
Despite the satisfaction of some senior KFOR leaders, local elements saw it differently.
Pointing to Kosovar Serb villages that were razed despite being close to major French and Italian KFOR bases, victims asked whether any senior KFOR officers would be held accountable. They talked of a "Srebrenica syndrome" in KFOR, and of the difficulty they will have in ever again relying on the NATO-dominated force for support.
KFOR holds a diametrically opposing view. Privately it speaks of a police collapse which obliged it to take over practically from the start. KFOR has moved to take back responsibilities it had devolved to the police and generally to assert itself over UNMIK. Within the security community, its interpretation of events and reaction is dominating.
KFOR's multinational brigades reacted in different ways to the challenge to their authority. by an Italian senior officer with sort of black humor was in fact surprising for all of us). In fact, all operational shifts were focused on the enormous amount of reports and statistics that were sent to superior HQ everyday.
As a result, operations within the brigade sector were fully in the brigade HQ responsibility and rules and standards as well as daily life differed so much between the brigades. Operations crossing the brigade boundaries were discussed between brigades with a passive KFOR presence. Orders or directing documents coming from the KFOR Main level were usually unrealistic or very general, therefore providing many ways of interpretation 33 .
The lack of centralized leadership had been in existence for some time and, during the first days of the crisis, became sorely evident.
Process of KFOR Transformation Without Reflection of the Developing Situation in
Kosovo. The development and changing of KFOR occurred as a natural process and transformation basically followed as a plan. As the situation in Kosovo evolved, more units began to shrink and routine tasks were changed. Peacekeeping forces became less robust, fixed tasks were slowly terminated, units were encouraged to perform a low profile and to use soft skin rather than armored vehicles. MNB(C) "Nordic" brigade with a Swedish dominated HQ was different. Command was more liberal, and subordinate battle groups and battalions were encouraged to act independently. Operations were focused more on training objectives than on real targets.
Individual search operations and an indeterminate strategy were the main activities in the first quarter of 2004. Stress was put on a low profile and "invisible presence".
Although some reports evaluated MNB(C) brigade operations in Caglavica as the exception to an overall KFOR failure, it wasn't as glorious a success as was presented. The initial indecisive attitudes to the Serb highway blockade, followed by the detour going through the entire Serb enclave in Caglavica, were significant mistakes that worsened the situation.
Passivity of the brigade senior leadership evoked disillusion in the brigade staff and escalated when Irish members of the brigade staff decided to act on their own and, as a group of officers, conducted several rescue missions to Pristina saving Kosovar Serbs and UNMIK international personnel. The Brigade command was not consolidated before the evening of second day.
The situation was critical and overwhelming, and it would be easy to point out other shortfalls. Nordic MNB(C) didn't have as many assets available as the previous British MNB(C).
However passivity, lack of anticipation and faulty analysis in the previous year resulted in a very there is the question of whether it was a waste to keep such an expensive unit just for the purpose of riot control. In the conduct of tasks other than riot control, the MSU appeared to be ineffective whereas KFOR units equipped and trained for riot control achieved the same results during the days of crisis.
Lack of Cooperation Between KFOR and Other Parts of the Security System in Kosovo was criticized long before the crisis. In fact, problems with the synchronization of actions between KFOR and police (both UNMIK UNMIK-P and KPS) were the most significant cases of local failures.
The following example describes one of the typical chaotic situations on the days of crisis. On 17
March some parts of the mob that drifted away from the Veterinik cordon came back into Pristina and selected the Serb Orthodox church in the old town market area as the next target. Most of them appeared to be teenagers. A small group of KPS officers struggled to stop their progress in the narrow streets of the old town. They were not warned when tear gas was fired to disperse the young mob. The gas left the KPS officers reeling, but had a limited ultimate effect on the rioters as it drifted out to central Pristina. KFOR sources have suggested that some KPS officers sided with the rioters.
In the confusion, as an Italian UNMIK riot police detachment arrived, one riot policeman was shot in the leg, possibly by a KPS officer, while another KPS officer was mistakenly shot three times by an
Italian. When the Italian riot squad arrived at the church, the teenagers scattered. However, the security forces simply evacuated the priest and departed, leaving them to return unopposed for their next and ultimately successful attempt to set the church and priest house on fire.
General lack of cooperation, mutual distrust and low effectiveness of joint operations were the results of a long term process of transformation of the security forces in Kosovo. The initial 45,000
man KFOR contingent was designed as a military force, primarily responsible for a safe and secure environment. Over time, UNMIK and UNMIK-P were supposed to take over responsibility for security in Kosovo, and serve as the foundation for training, education and the command of the future security force -the local police KPS.
UNMIK and UNMIK-P had not obtained a very good reputation for many reasons. First, the manning wasn't very professional. With few great exceptions (usually policemen from Europe or the USA), a corps of international policemen suffered problems already experienced in other UN missions -lack of language capability, low level of general police knowledge, low discipline, problems using a car or weapon, and sometimes even interpersonal or race incompatibility. Most
Chiefs of Police Stations had to fight those problems every day but they have never been officially mentioned. Many UNMIK-P members didn't have enough credibility to train, educate, and supervise their KPS counterparts.
KPS counterparts were the second reason for the mentioned problems. There were different categories of KPS policemen. First, policing in Kosovo is an economically attractive job -one of very few opportunities to obtain a low but regular salary; there are more than enough applicants. Not all of them are, however, qualified to be even chosen. Many local men asking for a job in the KPS had an unclear past; official records didn't exist, records from the Serbian administration were generally refused by UNMIK. It is not surprising that many mistakes were done in the situationmany people with criminal records or with "a shadowy history" in the conflict were hired, and then released. Corruption was a common, widely spread disease in the KPS. Some of individual KPS members felt more loyal to their local neighborhoods rather than to the professional job. Any joint KFOR/KPS operation became a public secret after initial planning. UNMIK-P policemen, responsible for the investigation of serious crimes (war crimes, drug dealers, murders) did not trust more than one or two local KPS members. KFOR units planning search operations could not declare the place of the operation in advance. In fact, because KPS member had to be present, and actually lead the search operation, KFOR units conducting the operation had to pick them up, ask them to turn off their mobile phones, and took them to KFOR vehicles without telling where the units were going to operate. KPS members were resigned and obeyed that procedure. Based on KFOR experience, that was the only way to avoid the leaking of information on the KPS side. After that humiliating posture, it's obvious that KPS members were rather passive.
Those methods were common in 2004, despite all political proclamations about cooperation between KFOR, UNMIK-P and KPS. In fact, in that year, the transition of authorities between KFOR and UNMIK-P/KPS was (or supposed to be) at the stage when the police adopted an official leading role among other parts of the security system. KFOR would provide only assistance and requested support. The reality was, however, different and KFOR remained the force which had to maintain the initiative, otherwise the security situation would stagnate.
Another factor hampering better cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK-P/KPS was the lack of structural relations. Liaison between KFOR units and police stations depended on the will and individual attitudes of KFOR and UNMIK-P local commanders. Regionally, KFOR areas of responsibility didn't fit with municipal/police boundaries of responsibility. Participation in regular meetings was on a voluntary basis and again, there were significant differences between individual
Chiefs of UNMIK-P. Most of them actively cooperated with KFOR but there were cases when the UNMIK-P Commander of a police station didn't want to cooperate.
As a result of all those problems, cooperation between KFOR and UNMIK-P/KPS wasn't generally at the level which was announced and which would be actually required during the crisis.
Despite many good examples of great relations between KFOR soldiers and UNMIK-P or KPS members on the lowest local level, joint operations were less effective. In accordance with plans for Kosovo development, KFOR should (and KFOR did) hand over responsibilities to UNMIK-P/KPS but they weren't prepared to properly fulfill them. Gaps over responsibility arose in certain areas.
In that situation when competences weren't clear and cooperation on a larger scale wasn't maintained, the flow of information was different and orders lacked unity, resulting on a lack of trust.
KFOR and UNMIK-P/KPS could not perform their duties better than they did.
Lack of KFOR Unit Cooperation. Unfortunately the lack of synchronization and organizational chaos was also identified between KFOR units. Joint operations for international units within the structure of the Multinational Brigade were common, therefore cooperation and command were rehearsed and the Brigade structure was functional. Also, units determined as a COMKFOR reserve (in that case NORTF), frequently trained for possible deployment to potential hotspots. During the crisis, Norwegians were able to cooperate very closely with local KFOR units and in fact, deployment of NORTF and their riot control means was probably the main reason for the success of KFOR units at Veternik ridge south of Pristina.
As previously mentioned, due to a lack of coordination from the KFOR Main level, Multinational Brigades lived, operated and trained with a high level of independence. Brigade commanders were also independent in their intentions to cooperate with other brigades. Basically, if there wasn't mutual interest on both sides, joint operations weren't conducted.
MNB(C) was more passive in that case saying that there is enough to do within the Brigade's boundaries . CS BG commanders, remembering the very active British style of cooperation were seeking cooperation on their own with both French MNB(N) and US MNB(E). The US command was repeatedly postponing and canceling suggested operations and, in fact, joint action never happened. Suggested actions were related to our common task of monitoring the International Boundary Line and maintenance border crossing points. A joint approach towards that task could unify the KFOR attitude towards the Serb counterparts. Other parts of cooperation were focused on patrolling very remote areas located along the boundary between the CS BG and the U.S. unit.
There was also an issue of the local police station which was responsible for the area located in both MNB(C) and MNB (E) areas of responsibility. Again, a lack of interest from the U.S. side ensured that nothing was done.
A different situation took place on the French side. In fact, the French command was very active and initiated a series of exercises with MNB(C) units, as well as with other brigades. Contacts were good at all levels; commanders and their subordinates knew their counterparts personally. Cooperation between units from different brigades was the exception rather than the rule.
Everything was done on a voluntary bilateral basis, without higher HQ intent or direction.
Communication between brigades wasn't direct and transmission of classified information, impossible. Most reliable tools for quick communication were personal mobile phones. (These problems were even more significant when the German Task Force from MNB(S) was deployed to the MNB(C) area of responsibility in order to reinforce the brigade in a period of rotation.)
Reshaping of KFOR Increasing capacity doesn't necessarily require higher numbers of troops. Final success and required readiness of the multinational security force could be achieved in many ways.
First, KFOR as a whole could adopt certain standard procedure which could be called an early In the case of higher intensity operations, COMKFOR submits his requirements to the
Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COMJFCN).
Revised Force Structure
The current structure isn't suitable for the new concept. As was described in previous chapters, there are currently three multinational brigades and one multinational task force operating virtually independently within their own areas of operation. This fragmentation of effort has certain advantages but, especially during crisis, many operational disadvantages.
The new concept assumes the KFOR contingent is divided into four maneuver task forces of a brigade equivalent. Each brigade task force is able to deploy and operate in any part of Kosovo (requires reconsideration of some of the national deployment restrictions.)
Better attention should be paid to the equipment, organization and structure of the Multinational Brigade Task Force and nationally offered means to meet requirements. Numbers of troops, their character and weaponry in the contingent are decided at the national level. There are some that believe that radical Islamists were behind the violence in March 2004 to divert attention from Iraq. 41 Although those theories seem to be a bit exaggerated, Kosovo could be an attractive base for European Islamic terrorists if a strong military-police international presence isn't maintained in that part of Europe.
Analysis of "New" KFOR Strategy
Ends
• The final status of Kosovo is a difficult international problem without much precedence.
• Official talks between the international community, representatives of • The KFOR main mission is to maintain a safe and secure environment. This should be enough as "the end state" for the current phase of the Kosovo deployment. After a decision on final status, KFOR can a) assist a smooth emergence of Kosovo security forces into the federation security system, or b) assist building of the Kosovo Armed Forces and their integrity into the European Security System.
Ways
• KFOR should maintain a high level of readiness through the early warning standard procedures. Frequent rehearsal of high intensity operations is necessary.
• There should be closer cooperation with UNMIK-P/KPS, greater development of contingency plans, KFOR should stay visible, and maintain its role as the leading and coordinating force within the Kosovo security structure.
• There should also be closer cooperation between KFOR, VSiCG and MUP. This will enhance mutual trust and will ensure smother integration of Kosovo society into the regional environment (in the case of both mentioned COA.)
Means
• Restructuring of the KFOR contingent in accordance with the new concept.
• Restructuring of C2 means.
• The Multinational Brigade Task Forces built and structured accordingly with stress on maneuverability, flexibility and riot control capacity.
• Increasing the numbers isn't necessary. Development of NATO reinforcements should be part of the contingency plans and should be exercised.
• Clearly articulated KFOR Rules of Engagement need to be introduced, based on graduated use of force response principles. National restrictions should be incorporated into contingency plans and understood prior to the use of a particular unit.
Feasibility
A new KFOR strategy is feasible. It isn't economically more demanding than the current one. In fact, the model presented currently by the Multinational Task Force (C) was adopted due to requirements for reduced costs. Without the transformation of KFOR Main, the model would be half way between old and new concepts.
Acceptability
A new KFOR strategy is acceptable for participating countries. Current restrictions on Kosovo wide deployments of some national contingents should be removed. Nations should pay attention to their maneuver force design to ensure their ability to deploy and sustain for a period of up to two weeks. The new concept is much more demanding on the KFOR Main HQ ability to analyze, control and command. The restructuring of KFOR HQ in Pristina would be required.
Suitability
A new KFOR strategy with a new concept of maneuver for the MBTF is certainly more suitable for post conflict Kosovo development than the current passive, cumbersome bureaucratic system. NATO COMJFCN would exercise more a progressive, active and modern way of operations.
Risk
The NATO part of risk is the ability to provide quick response for a deteriorating situation.
The maintenance of sufficient strategic reserves for the entire Balkan theater is essential. NATO COMJFCN is to provide coordination and establish priorities between requirements coming from KFOR (NATO responsibilities) and BiH (EU responsibilities). COMKFOR and his staff take risk in the procedure of quick and correct evaluation for early warning. Neglecting this problem can cause delay and actual failure in the mission. Overall NATO represented by KFOR can't afford another failure. This would cause loss of credibility with a direct impact on European stability.
Conclusion:
People, who are really familiar with problems in Kosovo, characterize the current situation 6 Maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo has been the KFOR mission since its inception. However, a number of incidents occurred as the KLA and Kosovar Albanians moved to the areas previously occupied by Yugoslavian forces. Massive population movements took place in the region when thousands of Kosovar Serbs fled in fear of reprisals by the KLA. Tens of thousands Kosovar Albanians moved in the opposite direction back to Kosovo despite the warnings about the danger of booby traps, mines, and unexploded ordnance. In the disorder and widespread destruction, KFOR was not able to prevent violence directed against Kosovar Serbs, their property and historical monuments. 7 There is no doubt that Mr. Milosevic, Karadzic, Mladic and many others are responsible for unprecedented killing of civilians, the worst since WWII. However, an objective picture of the situation in Balkans should include the Ustasha techniques of Croats dressed in the "Nazi" uniforms, or the brutality of Mujahedins fighting beside the Muslim Bosnian forces. To an unbiased student of the Balkan conflict it is difficult to judge which side was eventually worse. 8 Parallel structures created gap in communication between Kosovar Serbs and UNMIK/KFOR. Serbian citizens working for Beograd were often former UNMIK employees with NGO knowledge and paid better than their UNMIK counterparts. Parallel structures followed the Beograd strategy, different from UNMIK, however, mostly much more realistic. Administrators of parallel structures were more effective on a ground -they knew the environment better than foreigners in UNMIK, they got the confidence of the local people and in many cases Beograd supporters were faster in providing assistance.
Although parallel structures were capable and more effective to meet Kosovar Serb's requirements, UNMIK representatives refused to cooperate or even to communicate. Some KFOR units had the same attitude and simply ignored results of Beograd involvement. Ignorance and lack of will to compromise on both sides negatively affected the results of reconciliation. 9 Good relations with VSiCG and MUP appeared to be helpful particularly during March 2004 crisis. KFOR didn't have enough troops and assets available to maintain patrolling along the ABL or to block crossing points. Attempts of smaller radical groups of Serbs to enter Kosovo with intent to cause violence were stopped by MUP on their side. Extremely helpful was the sharing of information about the situation in Serbian territory when the KFOR Main source announced exaggerated information about large paramilitary crowds approaching to Kosovo. Serb liaisons assured the leadership of the Czech-Slovak Battle group (CS BG) that nothing was true and that KFOR units could keep concentrating on hotspots in central Kosovo. 10 The basic KFOR unit would be a highly mobile and deployable Multinational Brigade Task Force (MBTF). Eventually KFOR units would keep most of their logistics bases but they would not have their own areas of responsibility. A task force or its subordinate units should be deployable to any part of Kosovo according to an imminent requirement and self-sustaining for at least two weeks. The Task force would report directly to KFOR Main, and the KFOR HQ would have to adopt some of brigade responsibilities. Small KFOR cells would be permanently located in some of the larger towns in order to maintain relations with UNMIK, police, municipal representatives, and to collect intelligence information or assist with possible deployments. attacked the restaurant from both sides. Neither the local police nor KFOR came to the rescue. Rexhepi escaped, but the melee continued, with the World Bank delegation and accompanying retinue chased in their bus into the grounds of the hospital. Regional UNMIK officials reacted with press releases suggesting Rexhepi was to blame for not giving sufficient notice, and identifying the target of the attack as the World Bank delegation rather than the prime minister. In response Kosovar Albanian media vented their fury on UNMIK for blaming Rexhepi and suggesting he did not have the right to go anywhere in Kosovo.
Summary of Reports, KFOR, (December 2003) 17 In December 2003 hand grenades were taped to the axles of two UNMIK police cars but failed to explode. Four kilograms of TNT with a timing device were discovered near UNMIK headquarters on 6 March 2004 after a warning was phoned to police. This began a pattern that included a false bomb threat; two small explosions in Pristina on 9 March; a hand grenade thrown at President Rugova's Pristina residence on 12 March; and an explosive device found outside UNMIK headquarters in South Mitrovica on 13 March. Intelligence Summary, KFOR, 2003 KFOR, -2004 International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo , ICG Europe Report #155, (22 April 2004) 19. 19 The OSCE prepared and issued extremely critical information on the role of the media in the March events in Kosovo. 20 In the southern mountainous and predominantly Serb Strpce municipality, a crowd of Albanians arrived at the edge of the village of Drajkovac in the evening. They knocked at the first Serb house, shot dead a father and son, and withdrew. In Ferizaj/Urosevac, a crowd attacked Serb communities in nearby villages, and burned three Orthodox churches. In Prizren large scale violence continued. Teachers were inspired by the example of their peers in Pristina the previous day and formed the core of a mob that rampaged around the streets, smashing any shops that they found open. Two police stations were pelted with stones, and both police and UNMIK cars were burned. In Mitrovica, security forces drove small groups of demonstrators off with tear gas. There were minor clashes throughout the day: stoning of UN cars and KFOR vehicles, and some explosions. Sniper fire on KFOR and Serbs in North Mitrovica caused casualties. A group of Albanians with outsiders from either Gjakova or Drenica at its core attacked a Serb Orthodox church in South Mitrovica. In late afternoon, elements of the same mob that attacked the South Mitrovica church descended upon the Serb village of Svinjare, within 600 meters of Camp Belvedere, the principal French KFOR logistics base outside Southern Mitrovica. Several UNMIK police vehicles tried to get ahead of the mob and block its progress, as did a truck with Moroccan soldiers who were guarding the northern entrance of the village next to the base. The mob set fire to several houses at the north end of the village before the makeshift police/military roadblock deterred it from advancing. It pulled back, and security reinforcements arrived: twenty more soldiers and 50 Polish riot police. However, instead of consolidating their position, they were ordered to evacuate the villagers to the base and depart. During the evening and night, Albanian mobs were able to return unimpeded, and loot and burn every Serb house and annexed in the village.
South of Mitrovica, in the town of Vucitrn/Vushtri, two mobs converged to lay waste the Ashkali neighborhood. When Moroccan KFOR guards left, a crowd that included KLA veterans attacked and burned the St. Elias Orthodox church. The mob desecrated the cemetery, even disinterring human remains and joined with another mob, led by local criminals, that was attacking, looting and burning Ashkali houses. More than 70 Ashkali houses were burned.To the south west of Mitrovica, in Drenica, the medieval convent of Devic was destroyed. When shifts of schoolchildren changed around midday at the high school in Skenderaj/Srbica, a large crowd of them began to walk west, through and out of the town. Reportedly, teachers, municipality officials, local activists and journalists made attempts to convince them to turn back, but were swept aside. In advance of its arrival, KFOR evacuated all but one of the Serb nuns and departed. The children looted and set fire to the convent, holding the remaining nun as a hostage until TV cameras arrived to record their "humanitarian" gesture in handing her over to the police.
International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo, ICG Report #155, (22 April 2004), 47-51. 21 Crowds often featured a directionless, irate, uncertain majority, and a hard, aggressive, focused, determined, and armed minority. When the minority attacked, most would peel away. 22 There were probably more factors explaining why the violence was absent in some local regions. KPS sources claim that where they were permitted to run police stations and devise their own approaches, and that they headed off violence more successfully than at police commands where UNMIK-P merely used them as subordinates. KPS performance and proclamations were debatable and their professional responsibility for duty differed from place to place. Another factor noticed by the Czech -Slovak KFOR in the northern outskirts of Pristina was mutual assurance about "local peace" between the village mayors. 23 From the perspective of German soldiers who were unable to prevent the Prizren Orthodox churches, seminary buildings, and monasteries from being laid waste, the mobs acted systematically. A battalion commander noted that "they knew exactly how far they could go" in attacking without provoking the soldiers into shooting. Crowds and deliberate traffic jams blocked German KFOR reinforcements from reaching the beleaguered detachments. Similarly, during the protracted battle in and around Caglavica, Swedish and Czech-Slovak KFOR sources interpreted the mass of Albanians pushing on the village over two days as a determined military-style opponent. However, if the whole mass of them were determined to break through into Caglavica, they could have done it easily.
CS BG KFOR reports, (March 2004).
26 A mere dozen Serb villagers maintained the blockade of a highway at Caglavica at points. Proactive responses could have prevented much of the conflagration of 17-18 March. Instead, Swedish KFOR chose not to force the villagers off highway and monitor them -this soft attitude was common and appreciated by the "Film City people" ( KFOR HQ) at that time. The task was to allow flow of traffic from Pristina south along the highway. Choosing a detour going through Serbian stronghold Gracanica was however one of the mayor mistakes. Even though individual UN police officers sensed the rising tension in Kosovska Mitrovica on 16 March, nobody paid attention to their warning. Individual KFOR officers predicted significant problems on the morning of 17 March but sent no troops to beef up security at the flashpoint bridge.
MNB(C) report summary, (March 2004)
. 27 There are a number of testimonies about good and bad examples of KFOR soldier's actions. One of the most embarrassing stories comes from the western part of Kosovo, where the main Italian army base is a kilometer from the Serb village of Belo Polje, where heads of families returned in 2003 to rebuild their houses. When a mob descended on 17 March, and the villagers took refuge in the church, Italian KFOR troops did not dare approach in their vehicles but forced the Serbs to run to them through a gauntlet of young Albanians who attacked them with bricks and knives. If an UNMIK policeman had not shot and killed one rioter, causing the mob to pause momentarily, the Serbs would have been caught in the open and possibly killed. Nearly all houses were damaged or destroyed.
Another KFOR failure was reported by a witness from French sector during the French KFOR's attempts to defend the village of Svinjare, a few hundred meters from its major logistics base at Camp Belvedere on 18 March. UNMIK police reportedly gave KFOR two-hours warning that a mob was assembling. When it arrived, walking hundreds of meters along the camp perimeter and then burning the first house it reached, French troops and Polish riot police evacuated the Serb inhabitants. Looting and burning then proceeded throughout the evening and night, and all Serb-owned buildings were destroyed and livestock and pets slaughtered. Troops within the camp, including a company of Greek soldiers whose weapons had already been shipped home, did not oppose the mob. The arsonists appeared so confident of impunity that many scrawled their names and villages on the houses they gutted. A French KFOR spokesman justified troops' failure to emerge from the base to challenge the burning -saying they were too few in number.
In Prizren, local people said a more determined effort by German KFOR could have prevented the destruction of churches, monasteries and seminaries. There were reports of soldiers stepping away from their checkpoint positions as mobs approached.
International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo, ICG Europe Report #155, (22 April 2004) , 20, and personal records. 28 Nevertheless, many acquitted themselves bravely, rescuing beleaguered Serbs, Roma, and Ashkali from mobs. However, there were also plentiful accounts of KPS officers shying away from confronting rioting fellow Albanians. Some stood by as mobs torched houses or physically attacked Serbs. Worse still, some actually joined the rioters. Investigators have at least two instances in which KPS officers threw petrol bombs. According the reports of the CS BG KFOR units operating in Obilic and Podujevo, some KPS officers directed the mob against Serbs or their properties. Multiethnic police stations fell apart and Serbian KPS members refused to carry on their job under UNMIK-P commanders' command. Instead dressed in civilian clothes but armed with service weapon they organize homeland defense within Serbian enclaves.
Personal records, CS BG situation reports, (March 2004) . 29 On the evening of 18 March, school-age children were able to set fire to a Serbian Orthodox church in the centre of Pristina because despite the availability of at least 120 UN and KPS officers and the KPS dog unit at the nearby UNMIK police HQ, nobody with rank mobilized them to take on the crowd. Among the exceptions was the UNMIK-P commander of North Mitrovica police station, photographed leading from the front on the Mitrovica bridge, facing a stone-throwing mob without body amour.
International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo , ICG Europe Report #155, (22 April 2004), 46. 30 From 18 March onward, KFOR, UNMIK-P, and KPS coordinated closely in the Serb area north of the town and operated from a joint headquarters at Mitrovica North police station. However, in south Mitrovica the breakdown of coordination between troops and police reached its peak. On 17 March, police learned that French KFOR troops would not protect them or interdict snipers , saying they had no ammunition. On 18 March, acting on "totally untrue" intelligence from KFOR central command that 5,000 armed Albanians were on their way from Drenica, and 7-10,000 from Peja/Pec (phantom forces that did not materialize), French KFOR ordered UNMIK and the police (UNMIK-P and KPS) out of their respective regional headquarters in south Mitrovica. The French KFOR commander's brusque instruction to the police was: "Leave the building. Burn it down. Take away or destroy the computers". UNMIK-P withdrew across the river to North Mitrovica and Zvecan, taking computers or hard drives with them, but sensibly refraining from razing their headquarters.
The next day, French KFOR attempted to disband the KPS in South Mitrovica. KFOR then took over the Mitrovica south city police station and drove the police out with rifles at the ready. According to one report, troops aimed their guns at one group of KPS who tried to come back into the centre. The next morning, French KFOR checkpoints on the road south of Mitrovica refused to let KPS officers who live in the town's southern hinterland to go to work. On 23 March, UNMIK and the police were still trying to get back headquarters occupied by French and Belgian troops.
A competent source summed up the feelings of some police about French KFOR: "The only people they are actually prepared to fight against are us --just like they did in April 2002". Ibid, 20, 21. 31 Thrown together during the riots and their aftermath, the French KFOR forces and the armed Serb civilians of North Mitrovica were at one end of the scale. Their respective leaderships held several crisis meetings. At the other end, the crisis consolidated a close partnership between U.S. KFOR and the KLA successor organization the KPC, which saw them mounting joint patrols for nearly a week in some areas, with U.S. KFOR effectively granting the KPC the public security role it has coveted and been denied by UNMIK and central KFOR command. Ibid, 23. 32 KFOR no longer has adequate forces in Kosovo to oppose a determined Serbian military incursion. It has replaced most of its heavy armor with lighter formations. Many in KFOR and NATO assume that Serbia would not jeopardize its EU future by a military move. They may not appreciate the shift in the political winds in Belgrade, and that returning at least some of Kosovo to Serbian control may increasingly be taking precedence over pro-European policies. 33 A typical example of such directives was COMKFOR's Guidance for transition of authority over the crossing points at the administrative boundary line (ABL) in 2001. At that time the CS BG as the unit responsible for 102 km of the ABL between MNB(C) and the Federation Serbia and Montenegro maintained one busy crossing point at Merdare (on route from Nis to Podujevo and Pristina). In May 2001 the Commander of the CS BG received the COMKFOR's Guidance with a task to handover the Crossing point within one month to UNMIK-P Podujevo responsibility. In attempt to fulfill the guidance, the following problems appeared; Chief of Police station in Podujevo got no direction from his headquarters. He lacked personnel and equipment had poorly trained KPS for that task. The Guidance brought a new term "Kosovo Border Police" -defined as a unit transformed from KPS with the task to start securing and monitoring the ABL in four months. This was nonsense. KPS in Podujevo had no assets available for this mission. Kosovar Albanians KPS were afraid to approach boundary line with Serbs on other side. The term "border" stated in the Guidance has an international meaning whereas the Administrative Boundary Line is a special term from the official documents agreed upon between Yugoslavia and NATO. Nobody explained to Serbs that such a change (Kosovar Albanian Border Units monitoring the other side of the ABL as well as maintaining the crossing point itself) was going to happen. The chief of the Custom Office responsible for all borders and boundary lines around Kosovo was not informed. In order to enact the unrealistic order, after many consultations with British Commander of the MNB(C) and Chief of Podujevo Police Station, the CS BG CO decided to begin a project of joint training of KPS officers together with KFOR soldiers at crossing point as a gesture of good will. A month after the Guidance was issued, KFOR CO General Valentine visited the crossing point Merdare and sharply expressed his disappointment that Czech KFOR soldiers were still at the ABL. They stayed there another six moths until the KPS unit was trained, fully equipped, and psychologically prepared to act independently. The crossing point in Merdare was the first KFOR point handed over to KPS in Kosovo.
The CS BG summary of reports (2001 -2004 35 Ibid, 25. 36 The Czech Republic was one of the participants who reacted quickly. The following Czech contingent rotating in April was reinforced with 10 BMPs (armored vehicles which were so desperately required during days of violence) and with a company trained and equipped with the Riot Control Means. The Czech Parliament had to approve this historic first deployment of such a unit. The Parliament approved it in a remarkably short time.
37 UNMIK based its structure on four pillars. I) police and justice; II) civil administration; III) democratization and institution building; and IV) reconstruction and economic development. The United Nations leads Pillars I and II. OSCE and the EU lead pillars III and IV respectively. An ICG report in December 2001 argued that the international community should maintain substantial assistance to Kosovo so long as its progress towards economic self-sufficiency remains stunted by the lack of a final status settlement. Instead, disengagement has occurred without reaching such a settlement. For example, European Union assistance to Kosovo has tailed off at an annual 55-60 million Euros for the years 2004-6, down from 336 million in 2001 and 147 million in 2002. As a result, Kosovo's economy has begun once again to contract. Economic pessimism has grown steadily since July 2003 and import growth was down in that same year. Reduced purchasing power rather than increased domestic production, low agricultural and industrial activity and investment explain the decline. Ibid, 36. 38 The ICG recommendations relating to economic development in Kosovo were addressed to the Contact Group Countries (U.S., UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia) and other Members of the International Community. Making a substantial and sustained social, economic, and institutional development effort for the express purpose of preparing Kosovo rapidly for final status and transferring UNMIK's social and economic responsibilities to the PISG was the intent of the ICG recommendations. 39 Ibid, iii. 40 Other conferences are held with a similar purpose to evaluate the current situation and to address requirements for the future. They consist of different level of attendees and participantsoften officers serving in the KFOR structure at the time. Those people have excellent professional contribution for the conference but very low chance to influence structure of their next national contingent rotation. 
